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Abstract
The type theory λP corresponds to the logical framework LF. In this paper we present λH, a variant
of λP where convertibility is not implemented by means of the customary conversion rule, but instead
type conversions are made explicit in the terms. This means that the time to type check a λH term is
proportional to the size of the term itself.
We deﬁne an erasure map from λH to λP , and show that through this map the type theory λH corresponds
exactly to λP : any λH judgment will be erased to a λP judgment, and conversely each λP judgment can
be lifted to a λH judgment.
We also show a version of subject reduction: if two λH terms are provably convertible then their types are
also provably convertible.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Problem
This paper addresses the question of whether a formal proof should be allowed
to contain the formal equivalent of the sentence ‘this is left as an exercise to the
reader.’ Consider the following ‘proof’:
Lemma. A(3, 265536 − 3) = A(4, 3), where A(m,n) is the Ackermann function.
Proof. Compute the digits of A(3, 265536 − 3) and A(4, 3) using the recursive
deﬁnition of the Ackermann function (computing these strings of digits is left as
an exercise to the reader). These are easily seen to be the same. Therefore the
statement is true. 
Do we accept this as a proof of the Lemma? Probably most people would say that,
yes, formally it is a proof, but that, no, it is not a good argument for the truth of
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the statement, as there is no computing device in the known universe that will be
able to tell you the digits of those numbers (in fact, those digits probably will not
ﬁt in the universe in the ﬁrst place). But if you press them, they still would agree
that, yes, it is a proof.
In a theorem prover based on type theory, like Coq [14], one can simply formalize
this proof: deﬁne the function A (using higher order recursion) and say that ‘reﬂex-
ivity’ proves A(3, 265536 − 3) = A(4, 3). Then the type checker will start computing
the values of the expressions on both sides of the equation to see whether these are
the same. Of course, this is unfeasible, though theoretically this is a well-formed
proof term of this statement indeed.
Now, as a second example, consider this ‘proof’:
Lemma. There are no positive integers a, b, c and n with n ≥ 3 such that
an + bn = cn.
Proof. There exists a derivation 2 of this statement with a length less than 265536
symbols (the reader can ﬁnd it by summing up all possible derivations of length <
265536 symbols and seeing that one of them is a proof of the statement). Therefore
the statement is true. 
Now we do not claim that this ‘proof’ is in any way interesting for its own sake. 3
The question just is: should this at all be accepted as a – like in the previous
example, very ineﬃcient – proof of Fermat’s last theorem? We do know that a
derivation of the statement exists.
In a type theoretical proof assistant like Coq, one can actually formalize this
‘proof’, by deﬁning a proof search algorithm inside Coq. Using reﬂection we encode
our favorite logic (ﬁrst order logic, higher order logic or set theory) inside Coq
and we write an algorithm (a typed λ-term) that searches all derivations of length
less than 265536 symbols for a proof of Fermat’s theorem. This is a well-formed
proof term and its type is the statement of Fermat’s theorem. Of course, the proof
assistant will not ﬁnish type-checking that term before the end of the universe.
Again this is a proof by computation left to the reader.
The philosophical question is: is this second ‘proof’ again at least formally a
proof, just like in the previous example? 4
Finally, consider a third example:
Lemma. The non-trivial zeroes of Riemann’s ζ(s) function all lie on the complex
line s = 12 .
Proof. There exists a derivation of this statement with a length less than 265536
symbols (ﬁnding it is left as an exercise to the reader). Therefore the statement
2 The formal system in which this derivation is constructed should of course be powerful enough to prove
Fermat’s last theorem, but the speciﬁc choice of formal system does not really matter.
3 One should consider this example to be similar to ‘Schro¨dingers cat’ in physics. No one actually will kill
cats to discover something about quantum mechanics. Similarly, no one will gain any knowledge of number
theory from this example. It should just be considered to clarify the notion of what a proof is.
4 If you say that this is not a real proof of the statement (instead of just a very ineﬃcient one), then things
become interesting. Proof terms that involve reﬂection can run ‘searches’ by doing reduction. They can do
‘reﬂective proof search’ to solve small subproblems, which is considered as very useful and common in type
theory. But this is exactly the same kind of proof search that is happening here on a large scale.
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is true. 
Suppose you did agree that our second example contained a valid but very ineﬃcient
proof, and suppose that at some point the Riemann hypothesis is proved. Are we
then allowed to say that ‘oh, but we already have published a proof of the Riemann
hypothesis before’ (pointing to the paper that you are currently reading)? 5
At the TYPES meeting in Kloster Irsee in 1998, there was an interesting discussion
after the talk by Barendregt, where he had explained and advocated how to use the
βδι-reduction of type theory to add automation to Coq by letting it do calculations
during its type check phase. This uses the technique of reﬂection (see e.g. [4,11] for
examples and a discussion), where part of the object language is reﬂected in itself
to make computations and reasoning on the meta-level possible within the system.
Most people clearly considered this way of using Coq’s convertibility check to
be a feature. The only dissenting voice came from Martin-Lo¨f, who did not like
it at all and seemed to consider this to be a bug. We do not have an overview of
todays opinions, but the community seems to be quite unanimous that this kind of
‘automatic calculations by type checking’ is a good thing.
In theorem provers based on type theory the main performance bottleneck is
the convertibility check: if the calculated type of a term M is A, but it is used
in a context where the type should be B, then the system needs to verify that
A =βιδ B, where δ is the equality arising from deﬁnitional expansion (unfolding
deﬁnitions) and ι is the equality arising from functions deﬁned by (higher order
primitive) recursion. In fact, the ineﬃciency of the convertibility check means that
type correctness is in practice only semi-decidable. Although in theory it is decidable
whether a term M has type A, in practice when it is not correct the system could
be endlessly reducing and would not terminate in an acceptable time anymore. In
the Coq proof assistant [14], this problem is less noticeable because there many
deﬁnitions are ‘opaque’, which means that they cannot be unfolded. This causes
the equality check to fail and the user ﬁrst has to make the deﬁnition transparent
and unfold it. The Automath system [9] from the seventies just gave up after having
failed to establish convertibility after some given number of reduction steps. Type
theoretic theorem provers apparently search for a ‘convertibility proof’. This proof
would have to be rediscovered every time the terms would be type checked, and it
would not be stored in a ‘convertibility proof term’.
The HOL system [5,7] does not have a conversion rule. In HOL, β-reduction
is not automatically tried by the system, but is one of the derivation rules of the
logic. Similarly δ- and ι-reductions are performed using the rules of the logic. If
one considers a HOL ‘proof term’ that stores the HOL rules that have been used to
obtain a certain theorem [3], then this proof term somehow documents the ‘reduction
information’ that is not available in a proof term from the type theoretical/LF
5 Note that the last two ‘proofs’ really just ‘are’ the bound 265536 (it is the only interesting thing that
these ‘proofs’ contain). Can we consider a number to be a proof? Somehow it does not seem to contain
enough structure.
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world. 6
The goal of this paper is to investigate whether it is possible to have a system
close to the systems from type theory, but in which the convertibility of types is
explicitly stored in the proof terms (like it is done in HOL). The advantages of such
a system are the following.
• In such a system the type checker will not need to do a convertibility check on
its own. Instead the term will contain the information needed to establish the
convertibility.
• Because of this, type checking a term will be cheap. If we consider the substitution
operation and term identity checking to take unit time, the time to type check a
term will be linear in the size of the term.
• In such a system the type of a term will be unique, instead of only being unique
up to conversion. 7
• When rechecking a term, there is no need to recheck (possibly complex) equalities,
because the equality check is in the proof term.
• To check an equality, a reduction to normal form may be infeasible, like in
A(3, 265536 − 3) = A(4, 3). But we may have another ‘smarter’ way to estab-
lish this equality which we can store in a proof term of feasible size.
In the system that we describe in this paper, checking a proof matches much more
the image of ‘following the proof with your little ﬁnger, and checking locally that
everything is correct’ than is the case with the standard type theoretical proof
systems.
1.2 Approach
We deﬁne a system called λH 8 . The system is very close to λP , the pure type
system that corresponds to the logical framework LF [6] (currently implemented in
the Twelf system [12]). The main diﬀerence between λH and λP is that in the ﬁrst
the conversion rule has been made explicit, leading to a linear time type synthesis
algorithm. Note that type synthesis in λP is not elementary recursive, as equality
in simple typed λ-calculus is not (due to Statman [13]) and we can encode any
equality problem between simple typed terms as a type synthesis problem in λP .
In λH conversions are made explicit in the terms. If H is a term that shows
that A is convertible to A′, which we will write as
 H : A = A′
and if the term a has type A, then the term aH (the conversion H applied to a)
will have type A′.
6 Of course, as the HOL logic does not have dependent types, this kind of reduction is much less important
in the ﬁrst place.
7 So in such a system the type of a term will be (λx:A.B) a, or it will be B[x := a], but not both.
8 The ‘H’ in the name of the system reﬂects the letter that we use for the convertibility proof terms. So
λH is ‘the logical framework with Hs’, i.e., with convertibility proofs.
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Note that in our system we have explicit ‘equality judgments’ just like in Martin-
Lo¨f style type theory [10]. However there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence. In Martin-Lo¨f
style type theory there are no terms that prove equalities. The equality judgments
in such theories look like:
 A = A′ : B
and the equality is on the left of the colon. In contrast, in our system two terms
that are provably equal do not need to have the same computed type, so there will
not be a common type to the right of the colon. Instead we will have a proof term,
and so our equality will be to the right of the colon.
The fact that two terms in our system that occur in an equality judgment do
not need to have computed types that are syntactically equal, means that our
judgmental equality is a version of John-Major equality [8]. John-Major equality
is an inductively deﬁned equality, parameterized by two types: M =A,B N : ∗ if
M : A and N : B. It has only one constructor, reﬂA,M : M =A,A M . So we can
write down any equality between two terms, but an equality is provable only in case
both terms have the same type.
1.3 Related Work
Robin Adams has presented a version of pure type systems that have judgmental
equalities in the style of Martin-Lo¨f type theories [1]. However, he does not have
terms in his system that represent the derivation of the equality judgments. Also, he
does not represent the conversions themselves in the terms. Therefore in his system
more terms are syntactically identical than in our system. Another diﬀerence is
that he develops his system for all functional pure type systems, while we only have
a system that corresponds to λP .
1.4 Contribution
We deﬁne a system λH in which type conversion is represented in the proof term.
We show that this system corresponds exactly to the pure type system λP . We also
show that this system has a property closely related to subject reduction.
The λH system is quite a bit more complicated than the λP system. It has 13
instead of 4 term constructors, and 15 instead of 7 derivation rules.
1.5 Outline
In Section 2 we deﬁne our system. In Section 3 we show that it corresponds to the
λP system. In Section 4 we show that an analog of the subject reduction property
of λP holds for our system. In Section 5 we deﬁne a weak reduction relation for our
equality proof terms that is conﬂuent and strongly normalizing and that satisﬁes
subject reduction. Finally, in Section 7 we present a slight modiﬁcation of our
system, where we do not allow conversions to go through the ill-typed terms. Such
a system corresponds more closely to a semantical view upon type theory.
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2 The system λH
Deﬁnition 2.1 The λH expressions are given by the following grammar (the syn-
tactic category V are the variable names):
T ::= | ∗ | ΠV:T .T | λV:T .T | T T | T E
E ::= T¯ | E† | E · E | β(T ) | ι(T ) | {E , [V]E} | 〈E , [V]E〉 | EE
C ::= | C,V : T
J ::= C  T : T | E : T = T
The T are the terms of the system, the E are convertibility proofs, the C are the
contexts, and the J are the judgments. The sorts are the special cases of T that
are the elements of {, ∗}.
Deﬁnition 2.2 We deﬁne the erasure operation recursively by:
|x| ≡ x
|| ≡
|∗| ≡ ∗
|Πx:A.B| ≡Πx:|A|.|B|
|λx:A.b| ≡ λx:|A|.|b|
|Fa| ≡ |F ||a|
|aH | ≡ |a|
It maps λH terms to λP terms and is extended straightforwardly to contexts.
There are two kinds of judgments in λH: equality judgments and typing judg-
ments. The ﬁrst are of the form H : a = b, where H codes a proof of convertibility
(through not necessarily well-typed terms) of a and b. The rules for equality judg-
ments are independent of typing judgments. In the rules for the typing judgments,
equality judgments appear as a side-condition (in the rule for conversion).
Deﬁnition 2.3 The rules that inductively generate the λH judgments are the fol-
lowing (in these rules s only ranges over sorts):
deﬁnitional equality
A¯ : A = A
H : A = A′
H† : A′ = A
H : A = A′ H ′ : A′ = A′′
H ·H ′ : A = A′′
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β-redex
β((λx:A.b) a) : (λx:A.b) a = b[x := a]
erasing equality proofs
ι(a) : a = |a|
congruence rules
H : A = A′ H ′ : B = B′
{H, [x]H ′} : Πx:A.B = Πx:A′.B′
H : A = A′ H ′ : B = B′
〈H, [x]H ′〉 : λx:A.B = λx:A′.B′
H : F = F ′ H ′ : a = a′
HH ′ : Fa = F ′a′
start & weakening
Γ  A : s
Γ, x : A  x : A
Γ  A : s Γ  b : B
Γ, x : A  b : B
box & star
 ∗ : 
typed lambda terms
Γ  A : ∗ Γ, x : A  B : s
Γ  Πx:A.B : s
Γ  A : ∗ Γ, x : A  b : B : s
Γ  λx:A.b : Πx:A.B
Γ  F : Πx:A.B Γ  a : A
Γ  Fa : B[x := a]
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conversion
Γ  a : A H : A = A′
Γ  aH : A′
We write Γ  A : B : C as an abbreviation of Γ  A : B and Γ  B : C. We
write A =λH A′ if we have that H : A = A′ for some H. We write ‘A is type
correct in context Γ’ if we have that Γ  A : B for some B. We write ‘A is type
correct’ if it is type correct in some context. We write ‘Γ is well-formed’ if some
derivable judgment has Γ as the context. Finally we will write derivability in λH
as λH to distinguish it from derivability in λP which is written λP . (If we omit
the subscript, it will be apparent from the context which system is meant.)
The following lemmas about λH are immediate:
Lemma 2.4 Any subterm of a type correct term is type correct (in the appropriate
context).
Lemma 2.5 If Γ  A : B : C then C is a sort.
Lemma 2.6 If Γ  a : A then either Γ  A : s for some sort s, or A ≡ .
Lemma 2.7 (uniqueness of types) If Γ  a : A and Γ  a : A′ then A ≡ A′.
We now show that typing is in linear time by deﬁning a type checking algorithm.
Deﬁnition 2.8 Deﬁne the function type : C ×T → T ∪{false} simultaneously with
the functions wf : C → {true, false} and comp : E × T → T ∪ {false} as follows.
typeΓ(∗) = if wf(Γ) then else false
typeΓ() = false
typeΓ(x) = if wf(Γ) ∧ (x:A) ∈ Γ thenA else false
typeΓ(Πx:A.B) = if typeΓ(A) ≡ ∗ ∧ typeΓ,x:A(B) ∈ {∗,}
then typeΓ,x:A(B) else false
typeΓ(λx:A.M) = if typeΓ(A) ≡ ∗ ∧ typeΓ,x:A(M) = 
thenΠx:A.typeΓ,x:A(M) else false
typeΓ(MN) = if typeΓ(M) ≡ Πx:typeΓ(N).B
thenB[x := N ] else false
typeΓ(M
H) = if typeΓ(M) ≡ A then comp(H,A) else false
wf(〈−〉) = true
wf(Γ, x:A) = typeΓ(A) ∈ {∗,}
comp(A¯, B) = if A ≡ B thenB else false
comp(H†, B) = comp−1(H,B)
comp(H ·H ′, B) = comp(H ′, comp(H,B))
comp(ι(A), B) = if A ≡ B then |A| else false
comp(β((λx:A.M)N), B) = if B ≡ (λx:A.M)N thenM [x := N ] else false
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comp({H, [x]H ′}, B) = if B ≡ Πy:A.C
thenΠx:comp(H,A).comp(H ′, C[y := x])
else false
comp(〈H, [x]H ′〉, B) = if B ≡ λy:A.C
thenλx:comp(H,A).comp(H ′, C[y := x])
else false
comp(HH ′, B) = if B ≡ AC
then comp(H,A)comp(H ′, C) else false
The function comp−1 is deﬁned totally similar to comp, with two exceptions:
comp−1(ι(A), B) = if |A| ≡ B thenA else false
comp−1(β((λx:A.M)N), B) = if B ≡ M [x := N ] then (λx:A.M)N else false
Proposition 2.9 (type checking) Γ λH a : A if and only if type(Γ, a) ≡ A.
Moreover, the time for type to compute an answer can be made linear in the length
of the inputs.
Proof. One ﬁrst proves the fact that, H : B = C if and only if comp(H,B) = C.
Then Γ λH a : A implies type(Γ, a) ≡ A is proved by induction on the derivation,
simultaneously with ‘Γ is well formed’ implies wf(Γ) = true. The other way around,
one proves simultaneously that type(Γ, a) ≡ A implies Γ λH a : A and that wf(Γ) =
true implies ‘Γ is well formed’ (by induction over the length of the input: lth(Γ, a),
resp. lth(Γ)).
The time for computing comp(H,A) is clearly linear in the size of the equational
proof term H. The function type as deﬁned above is not linear in its inputs. To
make sure that type computes a type in linear time, one has to collect the ‘side
conditions’ wf(Γ) properly to avoid checking the well-foundedness of the (local)
context for every variable separately. This is quite folklore, e.g. see [2], so for
matters of exposition we don’t give the details here.
3 Correspondence to λP
Lemma 3.1 If A =λH A′ then |A| =β |A′|.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of A =λH A′.
Proposition 3.2 (‘from λH to λP ’) If Γ λH a : A then |Γ| λP |a| : |A|.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ λH a : A, using the previous Lemma
in the conversion rule.
Lemma 3.3 For A,A′ ∈ T ,
(i) if |A| ≡ |A′|, then A =λH A′,
(ii) if |A| =β |A′|, then A =λH A′.
Proof.
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(i) If |A| ≡ |A′|, then ι(A) · ιA′ : A = A′.
(ii) If |A| =β |A′|, we ﬁrst prove that |A| =λH |A′|, by induction on the proof (in
the equational theory of the λ-calculus) of |A| =β |A′|. Then we conclude by
using that ι(A) : A = |A|. We do some cases
• A ≡ Πx:B.C and A′ ≡ Πx:B′.C ′ and |Πx:B.C| =β |Πx:B′.C ′| was derived
from |B| =β |B′| and |C| =β |C ′|. By IH, H0 : |B| = |B′| and H1 : |C| = |C ′|
for some H0, H1, so {H0, [x]H1} : |Πx:B.C| = |Πx:B′.C ′|.
• A ≡ (λx:B.M)P , A′ ≡ M ′[P ′/x] with |(λx:B.M)P | →β |M ′[P ′/x]|. Then
β((λx:B.M)P ) : (λx:B.M)P = M [P/x] and we are done by two applications
of (i) (using |M [P/x]| ≡ |M ′[P ′/x]|).
Proposition 3.4 (‘from λP to λH’) Let Γ be a λP -context and a,A be λP -terms
such that Γ λP a : A. Then the following two properties hold.
(i) There is a correct λH-context Γ′ such that |Γ′| ≡ Γ.
(ii) For all λH-contexts Γ′ for which |Γ′| ≡ Γ, there are λH-terms a′, A′ such that
Γ′ λH a′ : A′ and |a′| ≡ a, |A′| ≡ A.
Proof. Simultaneously by induction on the λP derivation, distinguishing cases ac-
cording to the last applied rule. We treat four cases and abbreviate ‘induction
hypothesis’ to IH.
• (application)
Γ λP F : Πx:A.B Γ λP a : A
Γ λP Fa : B[x := a]
The IH states that there is an λH-context Γ′ such that |Γ′| ≡ Γ. Furthermore,
for Γ′ any λH-context such that |Γ′| ≡ Γ, by IH, there are F ′, a′, A′, A′′ and
B′ such that Γ′ λH F ′ : Πx:A′.B′, Γ′ λH a′ : A′′ and |F ′| ≡ F , |a′| ≡ a,
|A′| ≡ |A′′| ≡ A and |B′| ≡ B. By Lemma 3.3, we have H : A′′ = A′ for some H,
so Γ′ λH a′H : A′ and Γ′  Fa′H : B′[a′H/x]. We are done, because |Fa′H | ≡ Fa
and |B′[a′H/x]| ≡ B[a/x].
• (λ)
Γ, x:A λP M : B Γ λP A : 
Γ λP λx:A.M : Πx:A.B
The IH states that there is an λH-context Γ′ such that |Γ′| ≡ Γ. Furthermore, for
Γ′ any λH-context such that |Γ′| ≡ Γ, by IH, there is an A′ such that Γ′ λH A′ : 
and |A′| ≡ A. So Γ′, x:A′ is a correct λH-context. So, by IH there are M ′
and B′ such that Γ′, x:A′ λH M ′ : B′ and |M ′| ≡ M and |B′| ≡ B. Hence,
Γ′  λx:A′.M ′ : Πx:A′.B′ and we are done, because |λx:A′.M ′| ≡ λx:A.M and
|Πx:a′.B′| ≡ Πx:A.B.
• (conversion)
Γ λP M : A Γ λP B : s A =β B
Γ λP MH : B
The IH states that there is an λH-context Γ′ such that |Γ′| ≡ Γ. Furthermore,
for Γ′ any λH-context such that |Γ′| ≡ Γ, by IH, there is are M ′, A′, B′ such
that Γ′ λH M ′ : A′, Γ λH B′ : s and |A′| ≡ A, |B′| ≡ B, |M ′| ≡ M . So
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|A′| ≡ A =β B ≡ |B′| and by Lemma 3.3, H : A′ = B′ for some H. Now,
Γ′ λH M ′ : B′ by the conversion rule in λH and we are done.
• (weakening)
Γ λP A :  Γ λP M : B
Γ, x:A λP M : B
The IH states that there is an λH-context Γ′ such that |Γ′| ≡ Γ. By IH, there is
an A′ such that Γ′ λH A′ :  and |A′| ≡ A. So Γ′, x:A′ is a correct λH-context,
proving part (1). Now, for any λH context Γ′, x:A′ such that |Γ′, x:A′| ≡ Γ, x:A,
we know that |Γ′| ≡ Γ, so, by IH there are M ′ and B′ such that Γ′ λH M ′ : B′
and |M ′| ≡ M and |B′| ≡ B. As Γ′, x:A′ is correct, we can weaken this to obtain
Γ′, x:A′ λH M ′ : B′ and we are done.
Corollary 3.5 (conservativity of λP over λH) Given a well-formed λH con-
text Γ and λH type A in Γ,
|Γ| λP M : |A| ⇒ ∃M ′(Γ λH M ′ : A ∧ |M ′| ≡ M)
Proof. The second part of the Proposition ensures that there are N and B such
that Γ λH N : B and |N | ≡ M and |B| ≡ |A|. Then B =λH A, due to Lemma 3.3,
say H : B = A. Then Γ λH NH : A.
4 An analogue of subject reduction
The following proposition is the equivalent for λH of the subject reduction property
of λP . The system λH does not have a notion of β-reduction, so the statement
a →β a′ in the condition of the statement is replaced by a =λH a′. Also, we do not
get that the type is conserved, it just is conserved up to convertibility (so if a = a′
and a : A then we will not always get that a′ : A, but just that a′ : A′ for some A′
with A = A′.)
Proposition 4.1 (‘subject reduction’) If Γ λH a : A : s and Γ λH a′ : A′ : s′
and a =λH a′ then A =λH A′ and s ≡ s′.
Proof. From Proposition 3.2 we get that |Γ| λP |a| : |A| : s and |Γ| λP |a′| : |A′| :
s′ and |a| =β |a′|. By subject reduction of λP and uniqueness of types in λP we
get that |A| =β |A′| and s ≡ s′. From Lemma 3.3 we ﬁnally get that A =λH A′.
5 Conversion reduction
Deﬁnition 5.1 We deﬁne the conversion reduction relation → as the rewrite re-
lation of the following rewrite rules:
AA
′ →A
AH·H
′ → (AH)H
′
A¯†→ A¯
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H††→H
(H ·H ′)†→H ′† ·H†
We will now list some simple properties of conversion reduction (with some proofs
omitted for space reasons):
Proposition 5.2 Conversion reduction is conﬂuent.
Proposition 5.3 Conversion reduction is strongly normalizing.
(These two propositions even hold for terms that are not type correct.)
Proposition 5.4 (subject reduction for conversion reduction)
If Γ λH a : A and a → a′ then Γ λH a′ : A.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ λH a : A one proves that, if a → a′,
then Γ λH a′ : A, distinguishing cases according to the applied reduction step.
(The a → a′ case then follows immediately.)
Although this proposition is a subject reduction property, it is not related to the
subject reduction property of λP , as it does not involve β-reduction.
Proposition 5.5 If Γ λH a : A and a → a′ then a =λH a′.
Proof. If a → a′, then |a| ≡ |a′| and hence a =λH a′ by Lemma 3.3.
Proposition 5.6 A term that is in conversion reduction normal form does not
contain the operations A¯ and H ·H ′, and it only contains the operation H† in the
combinations β(. . .)† and ι(. . .)†.
This last proposition shows that we can do away with the A¯ and H ·H ′ operations
in our system.
6 Discussion
Imagine a formalization of the ‘proofs’ of the Lemmas from Section 1.1 in Coq. This
is doable and we obtain a well-formed proof-term. However, type checking each of
these proofs is completely infeasible.
Now imagine a version of Coq that is built on top of the logical framework λH.
When type checking a Coq ‘proof’ the system would need to store the reduction
information in the explicit conversions in the λH proof term that it would build
internally. Therefore that proof term would be impractically big. So in such a
system the proof would not be considered to be a real proof, as the underlying λH
proof object would be impossible to construct.
For this reason λH adequately represents both our unease with our ‘proofs’ of
the Lemmas, as well as Martin-Lo¨f’s unease with Barendregt’s talk in Kloster Irsee.
Note that this formalization of the ‘proofs’ of the Lemmas needs ι-reduction, so
it is not possible in LF itself. Therefore for our argument one needs to imagine a
version of Coq’s type theory that has explicit conversions: a system that relates to
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the calculus of inductive constructions CiC, in the same way that the system λH
relates to λP . We don’t see any principal problem with extending our system λH
to CiC.
7 Future work
An interesting thing to do now is to implement λH as the basis of an actual proof
assistant, to see whether it is a practical system for doing actual proof checking.
Part of such a system might be a term lifter that lifts proof terms from λP to λH,
inserting the conversions that were needed to make the terms type check.
Another issue is whether it is possible to build such a system in a way that the
bulk of the proof terms will not actually be stored in memory, but checked and
discarded while it is being generated. This is the way that HOL checks its proofs.
Barendregt calls this ephemeral proofs. So the question is whether it will be possible
to have a practical λH implementation with ephemeral proof terms.
7.1 Avoiding ill-typed terms
In the system λH, we have avoided the conversion rule by introducing proof terms
that witness an equality (and that can be checked in linear time). But the conversion
goes through T , the set of ‘pseudo-terms’. This is in line with most implementations
of proof checkers, where equality checking is done by a separate algorithm that does
not take typing into account. But what if we restrict equalities to conversions that
pass through the well-typed terms only? This is more in line with a semantical
intuition, where the ill-typed terms just do not exist. We can adapt the syntax of
λH to cover this situation and we put the question whether this system is equivalent
to λH. We call this new system λF . 9
The system λF has the same terms and equality proofs as λH, but the judgments
are diﬀerent:
J ::= C  T : T | C  E : T = T
So an equality in λF is always stated and proved within a context, in which the
terms are well-typed. The rules that inductively generate the λF judgments are the
same as for λH, apart from the rules that involve equalities, which are as follows
(in these rules s only ranges over sorts):
deﬁnitional equality
Γ  A : B
Γ  A¯ : A = A
Γ  H : A = A′
Γ  H† : A′ = A
9 The ‘F ’ stands for ‘fully well-typed’.
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Γ  H : A = A′ Γ  H ′ : A′ = A′′
Γ  H ·H ′ : A = A′′
β-redex
Γ  A : ∗ Γ, x : A  b : B : s Γ  a : A
Γ  β((λx:A.b) a) : (λx:A.b) a = b[x := a]
conversion
Γ  a : A Γ  H : A = A′
Γ  aH : A′
Γ  a : A Γ  H : A = A′
Γ  ι(aH) : a = aH
congruence rules
Γ  A : ∗ Γ, x : A  B : s
Γ  A′ : ∗ Γ, x′ : A′  B′ : s
Γ  H : A = A′ Γ, x : A  H ′ : B = B′[x′ := xH ]
Γ  {H, [x:A]H ′} : Πx:A.B = Πx′:A′.B′
Γ  A : ∗ Γ, x : A  b : B : s
Γ  A′ : ∗ Γ, x : A′  b′ : B′ : s
Γ  H : A = A′ Γ, x : A  H ′ : b = b′[x′ := xH ]
Γ  〈H, [x:A]H ′〉 : λx:A.b = λx:A′.b′
Γ  F : Πx:A.B Γ  a : A
Γ  F ′ : Πx′:A′.B′ Γ  a′ : A′
Γ  H : F = F ′ Γ  H ′ : a = a′
Γ  HH ′ : Fa = F ′a′
(Note that the ι(. . .) of λF just removes one conversion, in contrast to the ι(. . .)
of λH which removes all conversions at once. Removing all conversions generally
leads to a term that is not well-typed, so that is not an option for λF where all
terms have to be well-typed, even in the conversion proofs.)
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